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LOUISIANA'S NEW VENUE LAW FOR CHILD
CUSTODY SUITS: A CRITIQUE
In the 1983 Regular Session, the legislature enacted Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 74.2 which provides for venue in custody
proceedings.' Before the enactment of this article, Louisiana statutory law
contained no specific venue provisions for child custody proceedings. Cur-
rently, the Louisiana Civil Code contemplates the parent-child relation-
ship only in terms of paternal authority and tutorship,2 such that divorce
or judicial separation ends the regime of paternal authority and triggers
the regime of tutorship.' The parent awarded custody in the separation
or divorce decree has the right to be appointed tutor of the child,4 and
venue for the appointment of a tutor is statutorily provided.' However,
"the natural tutorship does not begin with the judicial pronouncement
Copyright 1984, by Louisiana Law Review.
1. 1983 La. Acts, No. 62, § 1 provides as follows:
Art. 74.2 Proceeding for custody; change of custody.
A. A proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor may be brought in
the parish where a party is domiciled or-in the parish of the last matrimonial
domicile.
B. A proceeding for change of custody may be brought in the parish where
the person awarded custody is domiciled or in the parish where the original custody
decree was rendered. If the person awarded custody is no longer domiciled in
the state, the proceeding for change of custody may be brought in the parish
where the original custody decree was rendered.
C. For the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and in the interest of
justice, a court, upon contradictory motion or upon its own motion after notice
and hearing, may transfer the proceeding to obtain custody or to change custody
to another court where the proceeding might have been brought.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 216 ("A child remains under the authority of his father and
mother until his majority or emancipation."); La. Civ. Code art. 246 ("The minor not
emancipated is placed under the authority of a tutor after the dissolution of the marriage
of his father and mother or the separation from bed and board of either one of them
from the other.").
3. La. Civ. Code art. 246; Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 724, 269 So. 2d 217, 221 (1972).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 250 ("Upon divorce or judicial separation from bed and board
of parents, the tutorship of each minor child belongs of right to the parent under whose
care he or she has been placed .... ").
5. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 4031 states:
A petition for the appointment of a tutor of a minor domiciled in the state
shall be filed . . . in the parish where the parent or other person awarded custody
of the minor is domiciled, if the parents are divorced or judicially separated.
If the parents who are divorced or judicially separated are awarded joint custody
of a minor, they shall petition jointly for appointment as cotutors in the district
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of custody and without appointment, although the right to be tutor is
then in existence." 6 Thus, if a parent is granted custody but is not ap-
pointed tutor of the child, a change of custody action would be a civil
proceeding for change of custody, not for removal of a tutor, and the
articles providing for venue in tutorship proceedings would not apply.7
The jurisprudence which addressed this gap in the procedural law was
described by one court as involving "some confusion . . . as well as some
seeming conflict." ' This comment will examine the concept of venue and
the objectives venue rules seek to achieve and will analyze the jurisprudence
as it existed prior to the enactment of article 74.2; then it will discuss
whether the "confusion . . . [and] seeming conflict" in that jurisprudence
have been resolved under the new article and will point out some prob-
lems that might arise under article 74.2.
General Overview of Venue
An analysis of the concept of venue is best begun by a statement
of what it is not. Venue is not jurisdiction.9 Venue is not "the legal power
court of the parish in which the proceedings for divorce or judicial separation
were instituted.
In all other cases, the petition shall be filed in the parish where the minor resides.
Article 4032 states:
If the minor is not domiciled in the state, a petition for the appointment of
a tutor may be filed in any parish where:
(1) Immovable property of the minor is situated, or
(2) Movable property of the minor is situated, if he owns no immovable prop-
erty in the state.
6. Griffith v. Roy, 263 La. at 731, 269 So. 2d at 224.
7. Id. at 734, 269 So. 2d at 225. The same should be true when the suit to obtain
custody is filed after a divorce judgment has been rendered. The parent is bringing a civil
action to obtain custody, not to be appointed tutor of the child, and the tutorship articles
should be inapplicable. But see Perez v. Perez, 359 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1180 (La. 1978) ("[W]hen the initial fixing of custody occurs after
divorce, the venue of the action to obtain custody is determined by reference to the law
governing tutorship proceedings, since the custody of the minor is one of the elements of
tutorship."); Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-
Private Law, 27 La. L. Rev. 423, 432-34 (1967); Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Private Law, 28 La. L. Rev. 312, 317-19 (1968);
Pascal, Tutorship after Separation of the Parents, 17 La. B.J. 267, 268, 270 (1969); R.
Pascal & K. Spaht, Louisiana Family Law Course 518 (3d ed. 1982) (arguing that the natural
tutorship vests immediately upon an award of custody to a parent, and that thereafter,
any action for change of custody must be characterized as an action for removal of a tutor).
Professor Pascal's theory has not been accepted by the courts. See Griffith v. Roy, 263
La. at 728-34, 269 So. 2d at 223-25.
8. Dupre v. Pelotto, 336 So. 2d 329, 331 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
9. See Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 307
(1951).
The distinction between jurisdiction and venue is plainly established. Jurisdic-
tion is a term of comprehensive import. It concerns and defines the power of
judicatories and courts. . . . It includes power to inquire into facts, to apply
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and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding
* . .and to grant the relief to which [the parties] are entitled."° Jurisdic-
tion in child custody cases is governed by Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 10l as supplemented by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act. 2 If these jurisdictional requirements are met, courts throughout
the state have "the legal power and authority" to hear the custody dispute.
The next question is which of these many courts may hear the case. This
is a question of venue."
Venue is defined in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure as "the
parish where an action or proceeding may properly be brought and tried
under the rules regulating the subject."'" Venue rules seek to place the
litigation in the court which is in the best position to decide the issues
at hand. The court of proper venue should be the most convenient forum,
that is, the forum in which the parties, the witnesses, and the evidence
relative to the dispute are readily available.' 5 To be added to these con-
siderations is the traditional rule that the domicile of the defendant is
a proper venue.' 6 The primary consideration in a child custody dispute
the law, to make decision and to declare judgment. Venue in its modern and
municipal sense relates to and defines the particular county or territorial area
within the State or district in which the cause or prosecution must be brought
or tried. It commonly has to do with geographical subdivision, relates to practice
or procedure, may be waived, and does not refer to jurisdiction at all.
Id. at 317. See also M. Green, Basic Civil Procedure 63 (2d ed. 1979).
10. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1 ("Jurisdiction Defined."). See also Sims v. Sims, 388 So.
2d 428, 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Lucas v. Lucas, 195 So. 2d 771, 778 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966); 1 P. Lamonica & F. Maraist, Louisiana Procedure and Practice 335 (1982).
11. La. Code Civ. P. art. 10 ("A court which is otherwise competent under the laws
of this state has jurisdiction of the following actions or proceedings only under the follow-
ing conditions: . . . . (5) A proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a minor if he is
domiciled in, or is in, this state.").
12. La. R.S. 13:1700-1724 (1983) [hereinafter referred to as UCCJAI. For a good discus-
sion of the effect of the UCCJA on Code of Civil Procedure article 10(A)(5), see Student
Symposium, The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1978 Regular Session-Private
Law, 39 La. L. Rev. 107, 118-20 (1978).
13. M. Green, supra note 9, at 63. ("[V]enue addresses itself to the criteria for choos-
ing a particular court among several which are jurisdictionally possible.").
14. La. Code Civ. P. art. 41.
15. See Stevens, supra note 9 (providing a comparative study of thirteen different grounds
of venue and of the considerations of convenience on which these grounds are based).
16. La. Code Civ. P. art. 42 ("The general rules of venue are that an action against:
(1) An individual who is domiciled in the state shall be brought in the parish of his domi-
cile .... "). See also Stevens, supra note 9, at 311 ("Convenience of the defendant is
the reason usually given for venue statutes which provide for the place of trial in the county
where the defendant resides-the theory probably being . . . 'that since the plaintiff con-
trols the institution of the suit he might behave oppressively toward the defendant unless
restrained'.") (quoting Sunderland, The Provision Relating to Trial Practice in the New
Illiniois Civil Proctice Act, 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 188, 192 (1933)).
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is the best interest of the child,' 7 and therefore, the court which decides
such a dispute must have access to the information that will allow it to
determine which parent is best suited to provide a home life that is in
the child's best interest.' 8 There are several possible parishes in which in-
formation regarding the circumstances of the child and his parents might
be available: the parish where the child resides, the parish or parishes
where each parent resides, the parish where the parents and child lived
together as a family, and the parish in which a prior custody decree was
rendered. In determining which of these possible places of venue should
be considered proper places of venue, several considerations in addition
to the accessibility of information should be kept in mind: the possibility
that child snatching could be practiced in an effort to manufacture pro-
per venue, the possibility that relitigation of custody issues could be used
as a means to harass the opposing parent, and the desire to resolve the
dispute as quickly and as conclusively as possible.' 9 These objectives and
17. La. Civ. Code arts. 146, 157; Babin v. Babin, 417 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982); Burch v. Burch, 398 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Lipari v. Lipari, 396 So.
2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 383 So. 2d 1384 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1980); McGough & Hughes, Charted Territory: The Louisiana Experience with
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 44 La. L. Rev. 18, 25 (1983).
18. For an interesting discussion of the values inherent in defining jurisdiction in child
custody disputes, see L. McGough, The Beast with an Arm for a Nose: Interstate Conflict
and Child Custody Litigation (Jan. 1984) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Loui-
siana Law Review).
The "best interest of the child" standard evokes an inquiry focused upon "the
child," and, thus, while the developmental needs of all children may be useful
guides, the specific situation of the child before the court may justify a deter-
mination which would not be indicated for all or even most children. The court
sits as a court of equity with the responsibility to hand-tailor a decree for a par-
ticular family. Furthermore, a custody determination exacts a dual perspective:
a looking backwards in time toward past relationships in an effort to make ac-
curate predications about the course of future interrelationships among the
principals.
The planners agree that they would want the court to have access to existing
information concerning four distinct and basic relationships: mother-child, father-
child, family-child, as well as the husband-wife relationship insofar as it may have
skewed the true interactions of the other relationships. As corroborative informa-
tion about these primary relationships, evidence would be useful regarding those
relationships of the child outside the home which are thought to mirror his func-
tioning within the home and in relationship with his family. The planners would
want the court to have access to objective evaluations of the child's special needs
or talents from adults with whom he has interacted in order to correct for paren-
tal deification or vilification.
Yet even if this information is amassed it is useful only as it enables the court
to make an informed prediction about which parent will be the more nurturing
parent.
Id. at 101-03.
19. The disintegration of the family can be chaotic and disorienting and is always
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concerns will serve as the standard against which the decisions of the courts
prior to the enactment of article 74.2, as well as article 74.2 itself, must
be judged. Factual Patterns Under the Jurisprudence and Article 74.2
Obtaining Legal Custody-No Separation or Divorce Suit Filed
An action to obtain legal custody of a child prior to judicial separa-
tion was authorized by amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:291
in 1978.20 Prior to the amendment to section 291, a noncustodial spouse
seeking custody of a child prior to judicial separation could do so only
through a petition for habeas corpus2' which has its own venue
provisions.22 However, for the spouse who had physical custody of the
child but feared interference by the other spouse and thus wished to ob-
tain a judicial decree of custody, habeas corpus was inappropriate.23 Now
each spouse can bring an action under section 291 to obtain or protect
custody, but section 291 has no accompanying venue provision. Though
no jurisprudence has been found in which the proper venue for such an
action was at issue, presumably the general rule of Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 42 making the domicile of the defendant a proper
venue would have applied prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 74.2(A). Article 74.2(A) broadens this general rule by also
allowing suit to be brought in the domicile of the plaintiff spouse and
in the last matrimonial domicile.
Suit for Custody Brought in Conjunction with Suit for
Separation or Divorce
Venue for an action for separation or divorce is proper in the domicile
attended by stress and anxieties about the future for both the parents and the
child. While society may not be responsible for the fracturing of the family, it
at least bears some obligation not to increase the stress of uncertainty nor to
unduly prolong the period of instability before the two new families can be
constructed.
Id. at 104.
20. La. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1984) ("Unless judicially separated, spouses may not sue
each other except for causes of action . . .pertaining to the custody of a child . . .while
the spouses are living separate and apart, although not judicially separated.").
21. Even though no suit for separation or divorce has been filed, when the parents
are actually living separate and apart, the statutory interspousal immunity does
not bar ... the courts from hearing a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by
one parent against the other . . . [because] the habeas corpus suit is actually
instituted in the interest of the children, although done so by a parent to effec-
tuate the state's interest in the welfare of these children.
Stelly v. Montgomery, 347 So. 2d 1145, 1147 (La. 1977).
22. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3822.
23. Comment, Custody of Children by Writ of Habeas Corpus, 24 Loy. L. Rev. 308,
313 (1978).
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of either party and in the last matrimonial domicile.2" This is nonwaivable
venue, and thus is jurisdictional in nature.2" The custody determination
was traditionally considered incidental to the suit for separation or divorce,
and thus venue for the custody suit was proper in the proper venue of
the principal action.2" Additionally, the generally accepted rule was that
"a judgment of divorce [had] the effect of terminating all prior orders
relative to matters incident to the proceeding, such as custody .... ""
In Wasson v. Wasson,28 a judgment of separation and custody had
been rendered in East Baton Rouge Parish. The husband later brought
suit for divorce and custody in Livingston Parish, his domicile. The court
held that since Livingston Parish was a proper place of venue for the
divorce action and since the divorce judgment in Livingston Parish would
terminate the prior custody decree rendered in the separation judgment,
it was proper that the issue of custody be considered by the court in Liv-
ingston Parish. A year later, the same parties were again before the first
circuit, ' 9 but this time the issue was proper venue for an action for child
support. The court again applied the rule that prior decrees of custody
and child support were mere incidents of a judgment of separation which
were abated upon a judgment of divorce, and held that Livingston Parish,
being a proper venue for the divorce action, was also a proper venue
to decide the issue of child support. The court reasoned that "to hold
otherwise would . . . disrupt the continuity of child support payments
and relegate the custodial parent to another action following finality of
the divorce decree." 3 The court, however, expressed dissatisfaction with
the rules which forced the custodial parent under a prior decree "to
journey to another parish to again litigate the issues of child support,
custody and visitation" 3 and allowed "a disgruntled husband, bound by
what he feels is a high child support award [or erroneous child custody
award], to move across the state to what he considers a friendly forum
and compel the wife to undergo legal expenses and time consumption in
relitigating the issue." 32 The court suggested that these hardships and in-
equities would be cured if a prior decree in a separation judgment remained
24. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3941.
25. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 44, 3941; P. Lamonica & F. Maraist, supra note 10, at 336.
26. Howard v. Howard, 409 So. 2d 279, 280 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
27. Wasson v. Wasson, 403 So. 2d 71, 72 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), Thornton v. Floyd,
229 La. 237, 241-42, 85 So. 2d 499 (1956).
28. Wasson, 403 So. 2d at 72.
29. Wasson v. Wasson, 402 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 720. It can be assumed that the court was similarly concerned in the previous
Wasson case, i.e., that if a divorce judgment was rendered without providing for the custody
of the children, the children would be without a legal custodian since the divorce judgment
would have the effect of terminating any prior custody decrees.
31. Id. at 719.
32. Id.
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viable as to the rights affecting the children despite a subsequent divorce
judgment,33 and noted that "a special rule for venue of the incidents of
separation or divorce [was] needed." 3
Although the court in Wasson felt that the problem required legislative
resolution,3" the Louisiana Supreme Court was first to act. In Lewis v.
Lewis,36 the court held that a judgment awarding child support had a
legally independent basis (the paternal obligation) and was not a mere
incident of a separation decree 3 Thus the rule that a divorce judgment
abates all attendant incidents of a separation judgment was no longer ap-
plicable to child support decrees. The Lewis rationale was extended to
child custody decrees rendered in separation judgments in Howard v.
Howard.38
Lewis and Howard, by providing that a decree of child custody was
to be considered legally independent of the separation suit. and thus would
remain viable despite a subsequent divorce judgment, answered one of
the concerns expressed by the Wasson court. No "special rule" for the
venue of this legally independent action, however, was forthcoming. Cer-
tainly if the custody suit is legally independent of the separation or divorce
33. Id. at 720 n.3.
34. Id. at 719 n.2.
35. Id. at 719.
36. 404 So. 2d 1230 (La. 1981).
37. Id. at 1234.
38. 409 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). The court in Howard made this extension
with no discussion whatsoever. It is clear that the obligation to support one's child arises
from the fact of paternity and not from the marital relationship. La. Civ. Code art. 227.
In fact, this obligation of support extends to illegitimate as well as legitimate children. La.
Civ. Code arts. 239-40. Thus the termination of the marital relationship in the divorce decree
should have no effect upon a prior child support decree since the obligation upon which
the child support decree was based remains intact. See La. Civ. Code art. 158; State v.
Seghers, 124 La. 115, 49 So. 998 (1909); 1 M. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise pt. 2, no. 1681
(lth ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959). To extend this rationale to custody decrees is con-
ceptually difficult because the custody of the child is often characterized as a right rather
than an obligation of the parents. "Custody incidental to paternal authority is the right
to supervise and direct the care of the child and his activities with a view to his proper
rearing and development and his health and safety." R. Pascal & K. Spaht, supra note
7, at 483 (emphasis added). But see I M. Planiol, supra, pt. 2, no. 1662 ("The custody
of the child is not only the parent's right, it is also an obligation from which they cannot,
in principle, relieve themselves."). Whether characterized as a right or an obligation, it is
clear that custody, like support, is based on the fact of paternity and not the marital rela-
tionship. See La. Civ. Code arts. 216-218, 220, 235, 236. In fact, when the child is il-
legitimate and formally acknowledged by both parents, both parents have the right to claim
the custody of the child. See La. Civ. Code arts. 245, 256; La. Code Civ. P. art. 4261;
Creppel v. Thornton, 230 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970) (holding father has the
right, based on the parent-child relationship, to sue for custody of his illegitimate child);
see also Note, Persons-Custody of Illegitimates, 17 Loy. L. Rev. 459 (1971) (discussing
the development of the law regarding a father's right to custody of his illegitimate children
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suit, it should have a basis of venue independent of that for the separa-
tion or divorce action. 9 Before the enactment of article 74.2, the statutes
provided only one conceivable legally independent venue for custody ac-
tions, that being the domicile of the defendant under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure article 42(l).1o If this was the sole independent venue, the only
way in which a divorce or separation suit could be joined with a custody
suit would be if the parent seeking the separation or divorce and custody
filed suit in the domicile of the defendant parent. It is questionable whether
the court in Lewis intended its holding to have the effect of restricting
the plaintiff's choice of forum in a divorce or separation suit in this man-
ner. "If it is customary to deal with [the child custody issue] in the same
suit as that of divorce or separation, it is nevertheless true that it cannot
be identified with the subject matter of the divorce or separation suit or
be considered incidental to it."'"
Article 74.2(A) gives an action to obtain legal custody a legally in-
dependent venue in satisfaction of Lewis and Howard and conveniently
lines up custody venue with proper venue in separation and divorce
proceedings.42 Thus although the custody issue can no longer, after Lewis
and Howard, be considered incidental to the separation or divorce suit,
article 74.2(A) allows the customary practice of dealing with the custody
issue in the same proceeding as the separation or divorce proceeding to
continue when the custody suit is a suit to obtain custody. 3 However,
up to the time of Creppel v. Thornton). Only when the illegitimate child has not been
acknowledged by the father or when the mother has not concurred in the father's acknowledg-
ment does the mother have a preferential right to the custody of the child. La. Civ. Code
art. 256(A). Thus, a decree terminating the marriage relationship should have no effect
on a prior custody decree since the basis of the custody decree is the parent-child relation-
ship and not the marriage relationship. It should be noted that the position taken by the
court in Howard was not unprecedented. See Pascal, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1955-1956 Term-Persons, 17 La. L. Rev. 303 (1956).
The question, then, is whether it is correct to consider judgments relating to the
custody of children . . . , though rendered in the same numbered proceeding
as the separation suit, as judgments incidental to the separation proceeding. The
writer is of the opinion they are not incidental, but independent judgments, and
therefore that the rights which they declare remain in effect even though the parents
may later obtain a divorce.
Id. at 312.
39. See L'Enfant, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Louisiana Civil Procedure,
43 La. L. Rev. 491, 496 (1982).
40. Id.
41. Lewis v. Lewis, 404 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (La. 1981) (emphasis added).
42. Article 74.2(A) would also apply in the Perez situation, supra note 7, in which
the initial fixing of custody occurs after a judgment of divorce.
43. La. Code Civ. P. art. 742, comment (b) ("The article provides that venue in a
proceeding to obtain custody should be where either party is domiciled or in the parish
of the last matrimonial domicile. This reflects the most convenient places to try the pro-
ceeding, and it is also the same venue as for an action of separation or divorce and would
thus allow the two matters to be combined.") (emphasis added).
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when the suit is for change of custody, article 74.2(B) applies and the
convenient parallel between proper venue for the custody suit and proper
venue for the separation or divorce suit disappears. A claim for child
custody brought with a suit for divorce is a suit for change of custody
when a prior separation decree awarded custody to the other parent
because, after Lewis and Howard, the custody decree is legally indepen-
dent of the separation decree and does not abate upon the rendering of
a subsequent divorce decree. Thus article 74.2(B) governs venue in such
a suit and the result is to restrict the choice of forum for the divorce
proceeding. For example, if a noncustodial parent wishes to sue for divorce
and custody in his domicile, he could do so only if his domicile was also
either the domicile of the custodial parent or the parish in which the
separation and custody decree was rendered as required by article 74.2(B).
Whether or not the court in Lewis intended its holding to have such an
effect upon the customary practice of dealing with the custody issue in
the same suit as that of the divorce, such restriction of choice of forum
in the divorce action is desirable. Denying the noncustodial spouse a handy
forum in his own domicile serves to lodge the child custody dispute in
a court which has access to relevant information, to deter harassment of
the custodial spouse, and to prevent frivolous relitigation of the custody
issue."
Change of Custody
Divorce or Separation Judgment and Custody Decree in Parish A.
Suit for Change of Custody in Parish B.
It was in addressing the above situation that the Louisiana courts
rendered their most confusing and conflicting decisions. Inconsistent opin-
ions were rendered among and even within the circuits.
In Lucas v. Lucas,'4 the third circuit held that venue for changes of
custody was proper in the domicile of the noncustodial parent. A judg-
ment of divorce and custody had been rendered in Caddo Parish. Subse-
quently, the custodial parent moved with the children to Mexico City.
The noncustodial parent removed the children from Mexico without the
consent of the custodial parent, brought them back to his domicile in
44. To allow a spouse to bring suit in his own domicile for divorce and custody subse-
quent to a prior decree which awarded custody to the other spouse would allow the hard-
ship and inequity with which the court in Wasson was concerned to continue. A "disgruntled
husband" could "move across the state to what he considers a friendly forum and compel
the wife to undergo legal expenses and time consumption [and the journey to another parish]
to again litigate issues of custody." Wasson v. Wasson, 402 So. 2d 718, 719 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1981). Lewis, Howard, and article 74.2(B) combine to foreclose the possibility of
such tactical maneuvering.
45. 195 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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Rapides Parish, and filed suit for change of custody. Jurisdiction in Loui-
siana was upheld under Code of Civil Procedure article 10, the children
being present in the state." Ostensibly, the court upheld venue in Rapides
Parish under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles 43(5) and 5091 .41
However, the court resorted to this analysis only after stating that "as
a general rule, the court where the child is domiciled, or is physically
present, is best qualified to determine, and most concerned with, the best
interests of the child." 4  Thus, Lucas can also be read as holding that
venue for change of custody is proper where the child is physically
present-an interpretation wholly consistent with the basis for jurisdic-
tion in the case under Code of Civil Procedure article 10.11 Several years
later in Hopkins v. Hopkins,0 the third circuit confined Lucas to its facts5
46. Lucas was decided prior to the adoption by Louisiana of the UCCJA in La. R.S.
13:1700-1724 (1983). In Lucas, the court stated that "the trend of decisions throughout
the United States seems to be toward assuming jurisdiction over the status of minor children
physically within the jurisdiction of the court regardless of the manner in which the children
were brought within this confines of the state." 195 So. 2d at 774. One of the express
purposes of the UCCJA is to "deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody awards." La. R.S. 13:1700(A)(5) (1983). In Lucas, the original
decree awarding custody to Mrs. Lucas was rendered on March 25, 1963. Shortly thereafter,
Mrs. Lucas and the children moved to Mexico City where the children remained until, on
October 15, 1964, the parents consented to an amendment to the custody award which gave
temporary custody to Mr. Lucas in Louisiana until June 1, 1965. Mr. Lucas returned the
children to Mexico City on June 1, 1965. Back in Louisiana, Mr. Lucas filed suit for change
of custody. The suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the children were no longer
in the state. At this point, Mr. Lucas returned to Mexico City and unlawfully removed
his children. The motivation present in Lucas to indulge in child-napping in order to manufac-
ture jurisdiction is absent under the UCCJA because the "physical presence in this state
of the child . . . is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to
make a child custody determination." La. R.S. 13:1702(B) (1983). For two articles dealing
thoroughly with the UCCJA and its interpretation and application, see McGough & Hughes,
supra note 17; Student Symposium, supra note 12.
47. [lit is clear that Mrs. Lucas is a nonresident . . . who has not appointed an
agent for service of process. Hence venue of a suit against her is where proper
service is made. [La. Code Civ. P. art. 42(5)]. Since this court has jurisdiction
over the status involved, i.e., the custody of these children, an attorney at law
was properly appointed to represent her and service of process was made on him
in Rapides Parish [La. Code Civ. P. art. 5091].
195 So. 2d at 781.
48. Id. at 780.
49. The Lucas opinion has been criticized for resolving the venue question in terms
of jurisdiction. See Sims v. Sims, 388 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
50. 300 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
51. The situation in the instant case is readily and easily distinguishable from Lucas
v. Lucas . . . . First, in Lucas there was a final divorce. Second, in Lucas one
party had moved to the parish where venue was sought and the other party had
left the parish of original venue and was at the time of the litigation living in
a foreign country. Third, Lucas concerned itself only with custody whereas the
instant case involves the amount of child support and the question of visitation.
19841 COMMENTS
and held that the court which rendered the initial custody decree in a
separation judgment retains exclusive venue to modify that judgment.52
The second circuit followed the Hopkins rule in Ahlers v. Ahlers,5
3
decided in 1980. Later that year, the same court rendered the decision
in Sims v. Sims,54 which was a substantial departure from the Hopkins
rule. In Sims, a divorce and custody decree was rendered in Parish A.
The custodial parent had moved to Parish B. The child was residing with
the noncustodial parent in Parish C, where suit for change of custody
was filed. The court held that after a divorce is rendered, suit for change
of custody should be brought in the parish where the divorce decree was
rendered or in the defendant's domicile."
Thus, prior to article 74.2, a party who wished to modify a custody
decree rendered in a prior separation or divorce proceeding could file suit
• . . [W]e want to make it clear that [Lucas] is limited to the narrow and
peculiar facts involved.
Id. at 662.
52. The defendant's argument in Lucas was that only the Caddo Parish court was com-
petent to entertain a suit for change of custody since the original decree had been rendered
in Caddo. The defendant cited the following rule, enunciated in State ex rel. Marston v.
Marston, 223 La. 1046, 1054, 67 So. 2d 587, 590 (1953), as authority for her position:
"When two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court
which first obtains jurisdiction and possession of the res . . . retains it to the exclusion
of all others." The court distinguished the Marston rule on the ground that it applied when
suits involving the same issues were concurrently pending in different courts. Then, noting
that other jurisdictions did adhere to an exclusive jurisdiction and venue rule absent concur-
rent proceedings, the court stated:
It is our view that a strict adherence to [this rule] is objectionable on several
grounds: It would work undue hardship where the parties move to a far distant
parish and would be faced with the necessity of transporting themselves, their
lawyers and witnesses back to the parish which rendered the original custody order.
. . . [The conditions under which the children are living] can best be determined
by the court of the parish to which the parents and the children have moved.
195 So. 2d at 779-80.
53. 384 So. 2d 474 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980). The Ahlers court held that a court which
renders a custody decree in a divorce judgment retains exclusive jurisdiction and venue to
modify the custody decree. One of the grounds on which Lucas was distinguished by Hopkins
was that Lucas involved a final divorce. Hopkins, 300 So. 2d at 661. After Ahlers, the
argument that the Hopkins rule only applied to custody decrees rendered in a separation
suit was eliminated.
54. 388 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
55. In dicta, the court stated that the change of custody suit should be brought in
the parish where a divorce is pending if brought as an incident of a divorce action, and
that after divorce, the change of custody action could be brought in any parish where the
child was situated. The court stated that this last possibility, which could be said to have
been authorized in Lucas, was "vulnerable to the declinatory exception of improper venue
and . . . the least preferred venue." Id. at 432. The court so held and sustained the excep-
tion of improper venue in Parish C.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
in the domicile of the defendant relying on Sims, but would risk encounter-
ing the Hopkins rationale if the domicile of the defendant was not also
the parish which rendered the initial custody decree. The plaintiff's own
domicile was a possible venue if the plaintiff's case was analogous to
Lucas, but Hopkins and Ahlers were contrary authority if the plaintiff's
domicile was not also the parish in which the initial decree was rendered.
Additionally, dicta in both Lucas and Sims could have led to the filing
of suit in the parish where the child was present. However, the holding
in Hopkins and further dicta in Sims indicated that this was not a proper
forum.
The legislature solved this dilemma by incorporating the Sims holding
into article 74.2(B). The parish in which the original decree was rendered
is still a proper venue under the new provision, but it is not an exclusive
venue.5 6 This change remedies the undue hardship that could result under
the Hopkins rules when the parties no longer live in the parish in which
the original decree was rendered.5 7 The legislature, however, seems to be
of the opinion that even under such circumstances, the parish which
rendered the initial decree remains "familiar with the circumstances of
the case"" and able to "rule in the best interest of the minor."' 9 The
Lucas result allowing suit in the plaintiff's domicile when the custodial
parent is no longer a resident of the state is also included in article
74.2(B).
6
.
Separation-Custody Decree in Parish A. Divorce Decree Silent as to
Custody in Parish B. Suit Brought for Change of Custody in Parish B.
In Howard v. Howard6 the father was granted a separation and
56. The court in Hopkins cited two cases involving alimony and child support as authority
for its holding. See White v. White, 272 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972); Caldwell
v. Gilbert, 253 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971); see also Dupuy v. Dupuy, 357 So.
2d 23 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978) (a child support case following Hopkins). It is open to
question whether there is any life left in the exclusive jurisdiction and venue rule as applied
to suits to modify child support and alimony now that the rule has been abrogated with
respect to change of custody suits.
57. See supra note 52.
58. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (c).
59. Id.
60. This is a proper venue because "the court would know the circumstances of that
party and could rule on a change of custody issue." La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment
(c). Thus, under the new statute the court is spared the tortured application of Code of
Civil Procedure articles 42(5) and 5091 that the Lucas court found it necessary to advance.
195 So. 2d at 780-81. Additionally, the implication in Lucas that the child must also be
present in this parish is also refuted under article 74.2(B). The result reached on original
hearing in Lucas is also incorporated into article 74.2(B), which allows suit to be brought
in the parish which rendered the initial decree when the custodial parent is no longer a
resident of the state.
61. 409 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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custody in Richland Parish, his domicile. The mother was later granted
a divorce in St. John Parish, her domicile. The divorce decree was silent
as to custody. Subsequently, the mother brought suit for change of custody
in St. John Parish. On original hearing,.the court, noting that a custody
action, being incidental to an action for separation or divorce, should
be brought in the parish of proper venue for the separation or divorce
action, held that once jurisdiction over the custody dispute attached in
Richland Parish, it continued for purposes of modifying the decree. On
rehearing, the court, following Lewis, held that the custody suit was legally
independent of the separation suit, and therefore the Richland parish
custody decree was not abrogated upon rendition of the divorce judg-
ment in St. John Parish. The court then affirmed the result it had reached
on original hearing, stating that "the proper venue . . . continued in the
Parish of Richland, particularly since that parish is and always has been
the domicile of the children involved.
' 62
It is difficult to glean from the opinion just what the court intended
to be the independent venue for the legally independent custody action.
The "continued in the Parish of Richland" language is reminiscent of
Hopkins, but one could also argue that either the domicile of the children
or the domicile of the defendant was the independent basis of venue.
Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2(B) now governs this situation.
After Lewis and Howard, such a suit must be characterized as one to
modify a prior decree since the prior custody award in the separation
judgment does not abate with the later judgment of divorce. Article
74.2(A), which governs proceedings to obtain custody, is not applicable.
The legally independent venue in this factual situation is, under article
74.2(B), the domicile of the custodial parent or the parish where the
original decree was rendered. Thus, the new venue provision answers the
questions raised by Howard, rejecting the possibility that the domicile of
the children is a basis for venue.
Separation-Custody Judgment in Parish A. Divorce-Custody
Judgment in Parish B. Suit for Change of Custody in Parish B.
In Parker v. Parker,63 the mother was granted a separation and
custody of the child in Bienville Parish. A divorce judgment and custody
decree again awarding custody to the mother were later rendered in East
Baton Rouge Parish, the domicile of the father. The father brought suit
for change of custody in East Baton Rouge Parish. The court characterized
the rule which allowed a suit for change of custody to be brought in
the parish which rendered a final divorce decree when that decree also
made an award of custody as a "jurisprudential exception to the general
62. Id. at 281.
63. 432 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
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rule of venue (i.e., Code of Civil Procedure article 42(1)) which . . .ap-
pears no longer to exist." 6 ' The court reasoned that this "former
jurisprudential exception"'" had developed as a result of the principle,
abrogated by Lewis and Howard, that custody issues were incidental to
the divorce action. Stating that "in the absence of any specific legislative
provisions which would apply to venue in child custody cases, we must
apply the general rules of venue,"66 the court held that under Code of
Civil Procedure article 42(1), Bienville Parish, the domicile of the defen-
dant parent, was the proper venue.
Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2(B) provides that a proceeding
for change of custody may be brought in the parish where the custodial
parent is domiciled or in the parish where the original custody decree
was rendered. The result in Parker would be incorrect under the new ar-
ticle if the parish which rendered the divorce and custody decree is
characterized as the parish where "the original custody decree was
rendered." It seems clear that at least such a characterization was in-
tended by the legislature for purposes of article 74.2(B).17 The court which
rendered the divorce and custody decree would be familiar with the case
and thus could rule in the best interest of the minor. Additionally, the
parish in which the divorce and custody decree was rendered is likely to
be the domicile of one of the parents (as it was in Parker) giving that
court further ease of access to and familiarity with the circumstances of
the party. The interesting question is whether the parish in which the
separation and custody decree was rendered is also to be considered "the
parish where the original custody decree was rendered." That court con-
tinues to have an interest in and familiarity with the case as well. It is
also likely that one of the parties is still domiciled in that parish. It can,
of course, be asserted that the legislature would have drafted the statute
to read "the parishes where the original custody decree were rendered"
if it had intended both the parish in which a separation-custody decree
was rendered and the parish in which a divorce-custody decree was
rendered to be proper places of venue. Even so, the statute is susceptible
of the interpretation that the plaintiff has three choices of forum if the
defendant is domiciled in Parish A, the separation-custody decree was
rendered in Parish B, and the divorce-custody decree was rendered in
Parish C.
It is submitted that the phrase "the parish where the original custody
64. Id. at 1012.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (c) ("Venue for a proceeding for change
of custody would be ... where the original decree was rendered because [that court] would
be familiar with the circumstances of the case and could rule in the best interest of the
minor.").
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decree was rendered" should be read "the parish where the last custody
decree was rendered" thus cutting off the possibility in the foregoing
hypothesis of suit in Parish B. The availability of information in the parish
in which the separation-custody decree was rendered would be superseded
by the availability of perhaps more complete and certainly more current
information in the parish in which the divorce-custody decree was rendered.
In addition, the narrowing of choices of forum generally serves to deter
harassment and relitigation.
Separation-Custody Judgment in Parish A. Divorce-Custody Judgment
in Parish B. Suit for Change of Custody in Parish A
Coincidentally, another Parker v. Parker68 case (Parker II) dealt with
this similar factual situation. The judgment of separation was rendered
in Jefferson Parish. By consent, the custody of the child was given to
the mother. The parties moved from Jefferson Parish and subsequently,
a divorce judgment awarding custody to the father was rendered in Iberia
Parish. Eight months later, the same court changed the custody from the
father to the mother after a contested hearing. Following this decree, the
mother moved with the child to several places in Louisiana, and in Oc-
tober 1980, to Colorado where she continued to move from place to place.
The child's location following the Iberia decree was unknown to the father
until January 1982 when he discovered that the child had been living with
his maternal grandparents in Jefferson Parish since June 1981. Having
located his son, the father, who was domiciled in LaFourche Parish, began
visiting him on a regular basis. In May 1982, the father learned that the
mother was intending to return to Jefferson Parish in order to take the
child with her to the Bahamas for an indeterminate amount of time. The
father filed suit for change of custody in Jefferson Parish.69
The court began its analysis by stating that there were two possible
places of proper venue: Jefferson Parish, which the court stated was the
most convenient forum, and Iberia parish, which rendered the divorce-
custody decree and the subsequent modification decree. The convenience
of a Jefferson forum was not, however, considered by the court to be
the determining factor. Neither did the court wish to base its decision
as to proper venue on the fact that it appeared from the record that the
defendant mother was still domiciled in Jefferson Parish. Rather, the court,
citing the Lewis independent action language, held that "even assuming
the defendant is a Colorado domiciliary, and therefore has no domicile
in Louisiana, the parish in which the child in suit was residing at the
68. 424 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 427 So. 2d 1198 (La. 1983).
69. Jurisdiction in this case was based on UCCJA, specifically, on La. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2)
(1983).
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time of the filing of the proceeding for change of custody, Jefferson parish,
was a proper venue." 7 In a footnote, the court noted that an additional
factor was that a Jefferson Parish court had rendered the judgment of
separation. 7 Thus the Parker II court seemed to hold that where the
custodial parent is a nonresident of the state, the parish in which the
child is present is an independent venue for the independent custody ac-
tion established by Lewis and Howard."
Article 74.2(B) does not include the parish where the child is located
as a proper place of venue. Thus the result of Parker M could be achieved
under article 74.2(B) only if the mother was indeed still domiciled in Jef-
ferson Parish.73 If the mother had changed her domicile to Colorado,
then LaFourche Parish, the Plaintiff's domicile-a parish not considered
by the court in Parker II as a possibility-would be a proper place of
venue under article 74.2(B). The court in the parish of the plaintiff's
domicile is said to be competent to make the best interests determination
because it would know the circumstances of the party seeking the change
of custody.7 ' LaFourche Parish, however, did not have and had never
had any connection with the child. Additionally, Iberia Parish, the parish
in which the divorce-custody decree and subsequent modification decree
were rendered, would be a proper forum under article 74.2(B). The court
disqualified Iberia as a place of proper venue because "none of the in-
dividuals involved . .. [had] any connection with Iberia other than the
fact that the plaintiff alone did spend some time there." '75 This summa-
tion of the Parker family's contact with Iberia Parish is perhaps too facile.
The father had done more than "spend some time" in Iberia. He had
been a domiciliary. An Iberia Parish Court not only rendered the custody
decision in the divorce suit, it also rendered the later modification decree.
Thus, while it was true that the mother and child had never lived in Iberia
70. 424 So. 2d at 482-83.
71. Id. at 483 n.6.
72. This was arguably the holding of Lucas. In fact, the court in Parker II stated that
there appears to be some conflict among Louisiana circuit courts regarding the
rules to be followed when the child is in this state but domiciled elsewhere (see,
for example . . .Sims v. Sims . . .and Lucas v. Lucas . . .). Because we believe
it unwise to judicially set inflexible rules regarding venue in custody matters, we
prefer the methodology used in Lucas over that used in Sims.
424 So. 2d at 482.
73. Article 74.2(B) allows suit for change of custody in the domicile of the custodial
spouse. Note that Parker 11 presents an attractive setting for a holding that the parish in
which the separation-custody decree was rendered, Jefferson Parish, should be considered
a "parish where the original custody decree was rendered." On this expansive reading of
the statute, see supra text accompanying note 67. Note also that in Parker II, the Jefferson
Parish court merely incorporated a consent custody order into its separation decree. Thus,
there was no previous fully contested custody hearing in Jefferson Parish.
74. La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (c).
75. 424 So. 2d at 482.
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Parish, it was not true that they had no connection with the parish.
It can be concluded that both LaFourche Parish and Iberia Parish-
the proper places of venue under article 74.2(B) in the Parker II
situation-would have had access to some relevant information concern-
ing the child's best interest. Nevertheless, Jefferson Parish was arguably
the forum best equipped with the information needed to make this best-
interest determination. LaFourche Parish, although it was the plaintiff's
domicile, had no connection with the child or the mother. Iberia Parish,
though familiar with the parties and their circumstances due to its earlier
encounters with the case and due to the father's former domiciliary status,
had had no contact with the parties for four years. On the other hand,
Jefferson Parish had been the family domicile at one time, was the child's
present place of residence and had been for the year preceding the suit,
and was the parish in which the child had attended school for the previous
year. Clearly, much evidence concerning the child's past, present and future
care and relationships was available in Jefferson Parish. Just as clearly,
Jefferson Parish would not be a proper forum under article 74.2(B).
The UCCJA as a Venue Statute
Parker H raises the question of the relationship between intrastate
venue problems and interstate jurisdictional problems. Although the court
in Parker II rejected the notion that the UCCJA was applicable to an
intrastate custody dispute,16 the argument can be made that the two prob-
lem areas-interstate jurisdiction and intrastate venue-involve the same
concerns and should be approached in the same manner.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act purports to control
the resolution of potential jurisdictional conflicts between the
courts of two or more states. However, an identical potential for
forum-shopping and conflicting decrees can and often does arise
in the context of intrastate litigation under the guise of venue
challenges. In many states, venue wars occurring within the
microcosm of a state are still encouraged by the same atavistic
policies of local control and territoriality which finally prompted
the promulgation of the UCCJA for the macrocosmic federal
system."7
76. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction act is concerned with avoiding jurisdic-
tional competition and conflict between courts of different states in matters of
child custody. The Act has no application to venue, a matter involving the opera-
tion of courts within a state which does not involve possible conflicts with other
states.
424 So. 2d at 482.
77. McGough & Hughes, supra note 17, at 24-25.
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The main concern of the UCCJA is the best interest of the child.7"
Generally stated, the express purposes of the UCCJA are to prevent the
shifting of children from state to state for jurisdictional purposes, to deter
continuing controversy over and relitigation of custody decrees, and to
prevent the rendering of custody decrees by courts in states which have
little or no connection with the child.79 Louisiana's adoption of the UCCJA
indicates legislative approval of these purposes and of the scheme developed
in the Act to achieve them. The dominant concern in deciding which court
within the state should hear a child custody dispute is also the child's
best interest." Perhaps an intrastate venue statute should be analogous
in purpose and design to the UCCJA given that both statutes seek to
achieve the same objective.
Prior to the enactment of article 74.2, the proposition that the objec-
tives of the UCCJA were not served in cases involving questions of in-
trastate venue was apparent. Cases such as Lucas which held that the
parish in which the child was present was an appropriate venue served
as an inducement to child-napping." Allowing a noncustodial parent to
bring a suit for change of custody along with a suit for divorce in his
domicile provided an inducement to relitigate custody issues and thus,
to harass the custodial parent who perhaps lived with the child in a dis-
tant parish. 2 The Hopkins exclusive venue rule, by requiring that only
the forum which rendered the initial decree could modify that decree
regardless of the lapse of time or the present domicile of the parties in-
volved, permitted a custody suit in a court which no longer had any con-
nection with the child or his parents.83
The legislature, rather than choosing a venue format analogous ii
design to the UCCJA,"' has attempted to remedy the above problems
through Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2. The following sections will
contrast the 74.2 solution to these problems with their possible treatment
under the UCCJA when read as a venue provision.
78. See Student Symposium, supra note 12, at 108.
79. Id. See also La. R.S. 13:1700(A)(1) & (3)-(6) (1983); Commissioners' Prefatory Note,
9 U.L.A. 111, 111-14 (1968).
80. See supra note 17.
81. On Lucas v. Lucas, see supra text accompanying notes 45-49; on Sims v. Sims,
see supra note 55; on Parker v. Parker, see supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
83. On Ahlers v. Ahlers, see supra text accompanying note 53. The original decree
was rendered in Orleans Parish. At the time suit for change of custody was filed, the mother
and child lived in Bossier Parish and the father lived in Texas. The court held that the
Orleans Parish court alone could modify its prior judgment.
84. The text of the UCCJA is easily converted into a venue statute by a mere substitu-
tion of the word "parish" for "state." See, e.g., Commonwealth Child Custody Jurisdic-
tion Act, Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 2401-2424 (Purdon 1978) (as they appeared prior to
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Presence of the Child: The Child-Napping Problem
The UCCJA was "designed to bring some semblance of order"85 into
an "intolerable state of affairs where self-help and the rule of 'seize-and-
run' prevail[ed]." 8" The UCCJA implements its purpose of "deter[ring]
abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to ob-
tain custody awards" 87 by providing that "physical presence . . . of a
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone 'sufficient
to confer jurisdiction on a court." 8 Additionally, the UCCJA contains
a "clean hands" provision89 under which a court may, in an initial decree,
and must, in a modification decree, refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when
the petitioner has engaged in child-napping.
The inducement to engage in child-napping is absent under article 74.2
because the parish where the child is present is not included as a place
of proper venue." However, there are circumstances, such as those in
their amendment by Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5364 (Purdon 1980), providing that "the pro-
visions of [UCCJA] allocating jurisdiction and functions between and among courts of dif-
ferent states shall also allocate jurisdiction and functions between and among the courts
of common pleas of this Commonwealth."). For articles explaining Pennsylvania's move
to a venue statute patterned after UCCJA, see Frank, The End of Legal Kidnapping in
Pennsylvania: The Development of a Decided Public Policy, 25 Vill. L. Rev. 784 (1980);
Turner, Pennsylvania's New Child Custody Venue and Jurisdiction Legislation, 49 Pa. B.A.Q.
471 (1978). See also Georgia Child Custody Intrastate Jurisdiction Act, Ga. Code Ann.
§§ 19-9-20 to 19-9-24 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
85. Commissioners' prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 111, 114 (1968).
86. Id. at 113.
87. La. R.S. 13:1700(A)(5) (1983).
88. La. R.S. 13:1702(B) (1983).
89. La. R.S. 13:1707 (1983).
90. An inducement to engage in child-napping does exist, however, under the court's
present handling of custody proceedings initiated under a writ of habeas corpus. This prob-
lem was encountered in Georgia and resulted in the enactment of Ga. Code Ann. § 19-9-23
(Supp. 1984):
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Code section, after a court has deter-
mined who is to be the legal custodian of a child, any complaint seeking to ob-
tain a change of legal custody of the child shall be brought as a separate action
in the county of residence of the legal custodian of the child.
(c) No complaint specified in subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section shall
be made:
(1) As a counterclaim or in any other manner in response to a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus seeking to enforce a child custody order; or
(2) In response to any other action or motion seeking to enforce a child custody
order.
(d) The use of a complaint in the nature of habeas corpus seeking change of
child custody is prohibited.
This statute is a codification of the ruling in Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232
S.E.2d 761 (1977), which dealt with a recurrent form of parental tug-of-war: A noncustodial
parent would unlawfully remove the child from the custodial parent and return with the
child to his county of residence; the custodial parent would file a habeas corpus petition
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to regain possession of the child in the county in which the child was now located, and
the noncustodial parent would counter claim for change of custody. Until Matthews, this
practice had been sanctioned by the Georgia courts under the rationale that the custodial
parent submitted to the venue of the court in the county of the noncustodial parent's residence
by filing the habeas petition. In Matthews the court held, as a matter of policy, that suit
for change of custody could not be brought by the noncustodial parent in his county of
residence. "We believe that by denying these parents a convenient forum in which to relitigate
custody, these practices [i.e., illegal seizure and detention of children] may be reduced or
stopped altogether." Id. at 203, 232 S.E.2d at 78.
It should be noted that this same tug-of-war is possible in Louisiana despite the adop-
tion of article 74.2. For example, a suit for change of custody would be proper under arti-
cle 74.2(B) in Parish A, where the original decree was rendered, or in Parish B, the domicile
of the custodial spouse. Assume the noncustodial spouse detains the child in Parish C, his
domicile. Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure art. 3822, the custodial parent must
file the habeas corpus proceeding in Parish C. The noncustodial parent can then reconvene
for change of custody, and by virtue of Code of Civil Procedure art. 1034, the custodial
parent could not raise the objection of improper venue. Indeed, the detaining parent need
not even reconvene for change of custody because it is the practice of the courts in a habeas
corpus proceeding not only to consider the detaining parent's legal authority to detain the
child but also to focus on the child's best interest in determining whether that detention
should continue. See, e.g., Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675, 677 (La. 1974); Cawthorne
v. Williams, 313 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975); Benoit v. Blassingame, 249 So. 2d
302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Note, Child Custody: Paternal Authority v. Welfare of the
Child, 35 La. L. Rev. 904, 906 (1975).
Historically, the justification for such action by the court is that habeas corpus is the
detainee's (i.e., the child's) remedy. Since a "petition for habeas corpus may be filed by
the person in custody or by another person in his behalf," La. Code Civ. P. art. 3821,
"it is essentially a writ of inquiry . . . and a proper remedy . . . to determine a controversy
concerning the right to the custody of a minor child. . . .The welfare of the child as
well as the rights of the parents must be taken into consideration." State ex rel. Jagneaux
v. Jagneaux, 206 La. 107, 111-12, 18 So. 2d 913, 914 (1944) (emphasis added). But as
authority for this sort of action, later cases have cited Code of Civil Procedure article 3830
("The judgment may order the person released or placed in the custody of a proper person.").
Such practice by the courts, however justified, is a virtual invitation to child-napping.
Absent the enactment by the legislature of a statute similar to the aforementioned Georgia
statute, the courts should adhere to a strict interpretation of Code of Civil Procedure article
3821 ("Habeas corpus is a writ commanding a person who has another in his custody to
produce him before the court and to state the authority for the custody.") (emphasis added).
Under a strict interpretation, once it is established that the plaintiff in the habeas corpus
proceeding has authority pursuant to a court order or decree of custody, the inquiry should
be at an end. The defendant who desires a change of custody would then initiate a separate
action in the proper forum under article 74.2(B). In support of this approach, see Wood
v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675, 678 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., concurring in the decree); Pascal,
Work of the Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Private Law, 28 La. L. Rev. 312,
317-18 (1968): See also Buchanan v. Malone, 415 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982)
(upholding the trial court's refusal to convert a habeas corpus proceeding initiated by a
nonresident custodial parent into a suit for changes of custody). While noting that Wood
v. Beard stood for the proposition that "it [was] appropriate for the trial court to deter-
mine the fitness of the custodial parent when the issue is raised in response to a writ of
habeas corpus," the Buchanan court held that Wood was legislatively overruled to the ex-
tent that it conflicted with the UCCJA. 415 So. 2d at 261. Since the trial court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain a change of custody suit under the UCCJA, the children were
returned to the custodial parent after her legal authority for this custody was established.
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Parker II, when, absent child-napping, the parish in which the child is
present is the optimal forum to make a decision as to the best interests
of the child.
Under a venue provision analogous in format to the UCCJA, could
the result in Parker II have been achieved? The most preferred jurisdic-
tional basis under the UCCJA is "home state" jurisdiction." For a state
to qualify as a child's "home state," the child must have lived in the
state with "his parents, a parent or a person acting as a parent" 9 for
at least six consecutive months preceding the filing of the custody suit.
The child in Parker II had lived in Jefferson Parish with his grandparents
for a year preceding suit. The grandparents, however, would not qualify
as "person[s] acting as parent" because they had not been awarded custody
by a court and did not claim a right to custody.93 Thus Jefferson Parish
would not have been a "home parish" under the UCCJA.
Article 74.2 includes the domicile of the custodial spouse as a proper
venue in suits to modify a custody award. The inclusion of such a forum
reflects the traditional notion in civil litigation that the plaintiff must sue
the defendant in the defendant's domicile94 and provides a type of "home
parish" venue.9" Jefferson Parish would not have been a proper venue
under article 74.2(B) in Parker II because the child was not living there
with the custodial parent. The analogy between "domicile of the custodial
spouse" as a basis of venue under article 74.2(B) and "home state" as
a basis of jurisdiction under the UCCJA, however, is not perfect, for
Louisiana does not require that a person live in a parish for six months
before that parish becomes his domicile.96 Thus a court in a parish where
the custodial spouse had lived only a short period of time would be a
proper forum for a change of custody suit under article 74.2(B). Whether
The only instance in which a court of improper venue may, in a habeas corpus proceeding,
properly inquire into the best interests of the child is when such proceeding is initiated
prior to judicial decree of separation or divorce and prior to judicial award of custody
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1984). In such circumstances, paternal authority con-
tinues, and both parents have authority to detain the child. The court, of necessity, must
resort to a "best interests" inquiry in order to determine which of the parents is to be
awarded custody. See Note, Custody of Children by Writ of Habeas Corpus, 24 Loy. L.
-Rev. 308, 312 (1978).
91. McGough & Hughes, supra note 17, at 29.
92. La. R.S. 13:1701(5) (1983).
93. La. R.S. 13:1701(9) (1983).
94. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
95. The child's domicile, and thus his "home," is that of his custodial parent. See
Stewart v. Stewart, 233 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Nowlin v. McGee, 180 So.
2d 72 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); La. Civ. Code art, 39.
96. See La. Civ. Code art. 41 ("A change of domicile from one parish to another is
produced by the act of residing in another parish, combined with the intention of making
one's principal establishment there.").
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the best interests of the child would be served in such circumstances is
questionable. The UCCJA did not define the "home state" of the child
in terms of the domicile of the child's parents, but rather in terms of
the amount of time the child and at least one parent had resided in a
state. "Most American children are integrated into an American com-
munity after living there six months; consequently this period of residence
would seem to provide a reasonable criterion for identifying the established
home."97 Implicit in this definition of "home state" is the view that the
state's interest in its domiciliaries alone does not give it the power to decide
the custody suit. Rather, it is the parties' actual connection, qualitative
and quantitative, with a state that is determinative of whether the child's
best interest would be met by allowing the courts of that state to decide
the custody dispute. Likewise, in connection with venue, the fact of
domicile in a parish should not be the reason for allowing suit in that
parish. Thus while both the UCCJA and article 74.2(B) provide that the
court in the child's "home" can hear a change of custody suit, the UCCJA
definition of "home" more closely serves the purpose of insuring that
the court which decides the case has access to the information necessary
to make a determination as to the child's best interest. For example,
assume that the family had lived together in East Baton Rouge Parish
for at least six months. The parents are granted a divorce and a custody
decree is rendered by an East Baton Rouge court awarding custody to
the mother. The mother then moves with the child to Caddo Parish in-
tending to make Caddo Parish her home. Under article 74.2(B), the father
could file suit for change of custody in Caddo Parish immediately after
the mother and child established a residence there. The Caddo Parish court
would have no information other than the testimony of the parents on
which to base its decision regarding which of the parents would provide
a home life for the child in accordance with the child's best interest. The
mother and child simply would not have had sufficient time to become
"integrated into [the Caddo Parish] community."'" If Louisiana adopted
a definition of "home parish" analogous to the UCCJA definition of
"home state," there would be a six month waiting period after the
custodial parent moved to a new parish before that parish became a pro-
per venue for a change of custody action. In this example, if the father
wished to bring suit for change of custody within six months of the
mother's relocation, he would have to bring suit in East Baton Rouge
which, since the family had lived there for a sufficient length of time,
would have access to the needed information.99
97. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 818 (1964) (em-
phasis added).
98. Id.
99. The effect of utilizing the UCCJA as a venue provision in this hypothetical seems
to put an unfair burden on the custodial parent who perhaps has been forced to move
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The second major basis of jurisdiction under the UCCJA is known
as "significant connection" jurisdiction. In order for a state to have
jurisdiction under this provision, it must be in the child's best interest
for the state to assume jurisdiction, the child and at least one parent must
have a significant connection with the state, and there must be substan-
tial evidence in the state concerning the child. ' Apparently Jefferson
Parish would have met the requirements of an analogous "significant con-
nection" venue provision.'0 ' Jefferson Parish had been the domicile of
all the parties at one time and was the parish in which the child had
resided and attended school for the year preceding the suit. It was also
the parish in which the child's grandparents, his custodians for the prior
year, lived and the parish in which the child was regularly visited by his
father for the four months prior to the institution of the custody suit.
Obviously, the child had a significant connection with Jefferson Parish.
The jurisdictional requirement, however, is that "the child and his parents,
or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection
with [the] state."'0 2 Five years previously, both parents had been
domiciliaries of Jefferson Parish, however neither was domiciled there at
the time of suit. The question arises whether the "significant connection"
basis, when used as a venue provision, requires domicile or, at least,
residence of one parent in the parish in question. Although the question
has not arisen under the UCCJA,0 3 presumably residence in the state of
from the family domicile as a result of the disintegration of the marriage. This would seem
especially true if the noncustodial parent continued to live in the family domicile because
this parent would be effectively granted a forum for change of custody in his own domicile.
However, the argument can be made that the value of placing the suit before a court that
has optional access to information regarding this child's best interest should, in this in-
stance, be allowed to outweigh the competing value of preventing relitigation of custody
decrees and harassment of the custodial parent. In the event that both noncustodial and
custodial parents have moved from the child's "home parish," and both parents deem it
inconvenient to return to that parish to litigate, they could consent to suit for change of
custody elsewhere. Additionally, if an emergency required the bringing of suit in a parish
that had not yet become a "home parish," then La. R.S. 13:1702(3), read as a venue provi-
sion, would provide proper venue in the parish where the child was physically present.
100. La. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2) (1983).
101. Note that the court in Parker H based their assertion of jurisdiction on the "signifi-
cant connection" basis of the UCCJA.
[The child) has attended school for the past year in Louisiana [in Jefferson Parish].
His father and stepmother reside here. Both his paternal and maternal grand-
parents live in Louisiana [maternal grandparents live in Jefferson Parish], and
the witnesses needed for a proper determination of custody ... now live in or
close to-Jefferson Parish.
424 So. 2d at 481-82.
102. La. R.S. 13:1702(A)(2) (1983) (emphasis added).
103. The question would arise under the UCCJA if the Parker II factual situation were
elevated to an interstate jurisdictional dispute-i.e., child is living with grandparents in State
A for over 6 months, custodial parent is living in State B, and noncustodial parent is living
in State C; noncustodial parent brings suit for change of custody in State C.
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a parent would be a prerequisite to a finding of a significant connection
with the state.
[The "significant connection" provision's] purpose is to limit
jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it. The first clause of the
paragraph is important: jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's
interest, not merely the interest or convenience of the feuding par-
ties, to determine custody in a particular state.
The interest of the child is served when the forum has optimum access
to relevant evidence about the child and family. There must be maximum
rather than minimum contact with the state. The submission of the par-
ties to a forum . . . is not sufficient without additional factors establishing
closer ties with the state.' 4 Thus, even if the "significant connection"
provision of the UCCJA was utilized to determine proper venue in the
Parker H situation, the result would be the same as under article 74.2(B):
Jefferson Parish would not be a proper venue. Can it be concluded, then,
that the parishes listed in article 74.2(B) are the functional equivalent of
the UCCJA "significant connection" forum? The argument can be made
that article 74.2 is but a specific listing of the parishes which were deemed
by the legislature to meet the "significant connection" text. ' Thus,
through article 74.2 the legislature insures that the custody dispute will
be heard in a parish with "maximum contact" with the child and at least
one parent, while sparing the courts the task of defining "significant con-
nection" on a case by case basis. In Parker II, decided under article
74.2(B), the plaintiff could have filed suit in his domicile, LaFourche
Parish, since the defendant spouse was a nonresident. LaFourche, however,
had no connection at all with the child. Additionally, Iberia Parish, the
former domicile of the plaintiff and the parish where the divorce-custody
and subsequent modification decrees were rendered, would have been a
proper forum under article 74.2(B). Since neither of the parents lived in
Iberia at the commencement of the proceedings, it would not meet the
basic residence requirement previously discussed and would thus be dis-
qualified as a forum under the "significant connection" test even though,
like Jefferson Parish, Iberia did have some contact with the Parkers and
their child.' 6 Thus in both instances article 74.2(B) would have allowed
104. UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 124, commissioners' note (1968) (emphasis added).
105. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (c).
106. The court in Iberia Parish had rendered a custody decree in the divorce proceeding
and had rendered a subsequent change of custody decree after a contested hearing. This
court was definitely familiar with the circumstances of the case and, if one parent had
continued to live in the parish, would probably meet the "significant connection" test. Ar-
ticle 74.2 seems to contemplate that the court which rendered the initial decree did so after
a hearing. If a court merely incorporated a consent decree into its judgment or merely
affirmed an award made by another court in a previous proceeding, it does not seem cor-
rect to say that that court "would be familiar with the circumstances of the case and could
rule in the best interests of the minor." La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (c).
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suit in parishes which had access to some information relevant to the
child's best interest but did not have "optimum access to relevant evidence
about the child and family."" 7 By enumerating the parishes which were
deemed to possess the "significant connection" with the child and his
parent or parents, the legislature has spcceeded in bringing specificity and
predictability into a formerly confused area. However, a consequence of
such enumeration is to keep the Parker IH-type case in a forum which
is not optimally equipped to decide it in the child's best interest.
If the UCCJA was used to dictate proper venue in a Parker II situa-
tion, Jefferson Parish would not meet either the "home state" or "signifi-
cant connection" tests. Neither would Iberia, LaFourche or any other
parish in the state. However, Jefferson Parish does seem to be "the forum
[with] optimum access to relevant evidence about the child and his
family." ' I" The result reached by the court in Parker II could be achieved
by application of the "residual" provision of the UCCJA which "allows
a state to assume jurisdiction over a custody dispute when no other state
meets the requisites of the previous sections"' 0 9 (i.e., "home state" or
"significant connection") and also "allows a court to depart from the
Act's general rule that mere physical presence of the child in a state is
insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon its courts.""' Because article 74.2
contains no such "residual" basis of venue, the result of Parker II-
proper venue in Jefferson Parish-which seems correct in terms of plac-
ing the litigation before a court best equipped to decide in accordance
with the child's best interest, is no longer obtainable under the article's
provisions.
Plaintiff's Domicile as Proper Venue: Initial Decree
As previously discussed, the effect of the Lewis and Howard deci-
sions which characterized a decree of custody as legally independent of
the separation decree has been to change the characterization of a subse-
quent suit brought by the noncustodial spouse for divorce and custody
from a proceeding to obtain custody to a proceeding for change of
custody."' Since the plaintiff's domicile is not a proper venue for a change
of custody suit, the prior inducement to relitigate custody decrees and
harass the custodial parent no longer exists. A parent may, however, under
Article 74.2(A) sue for separation or divorce and initial custody in his
own domicile. Since a person can establish a domicile in a parish simply
by acquiring a residence there and by evincing an intent to make that
parish his home,'' 2 it is possible that under article 74.2(A), the suit to
107. UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 124, commissioners' note (1968) (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. McGough & Hughes, supra note 17, at 31. See also La. R.S. 13:1702(A)(4) (1983).
110. McGough & Hughes, supra note 17, at 31. See also La. R.S. 13:1702(B) (1983).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
112. La. Civ. Code art. 41.
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obtain custody could be brought before a court which had no connection
with the child and only very recent connection with the domiciliary. It
is questionable whether such a court would have access to the informa-
tion necessary to make a decision in the child's best interest. Another
possibility is that a parent, cognizant of the availability of a forum in
his own domicile, might move in order to obtain a friendly forum or
to prevent a less mobile parent from contesting the claim. In such an
event, the plaintiff's domiciliary status would be open to attack, but litiga-
tion of such procedural matters should be avoided in the interest of judicial
efficiency and the speedy resolution of child custody disputes.
Under the UCCJA, divorce jurisdiction in a state does not necessarily
include custody jurisdiction.' 3 "The submission of the parties to a forum,
perhaps for purposes of divorce, is not sufficient without additional fac-
tors establishing closer ties with the state."'' 4 Similarly, in matters of venue
in child custody disputes; the interest in judicial efficiency and
convenience '" should not be allowed to outweigh the paramount concern
of putting the litigation before a court which is best able to make a deter-
mination as to the child's best interest. Additionally, under the UCCJA,
jurisdiction in a state is never based on domicile alone. ' " The six-month
residence prerequisite to "home state" status and the maximum contacts
required by "substantial connection" jurisdiction reduce the temptation
to engage in forum shopping and help to insure that the case will be heard
by a court which has access to the relevant information.
Article 74.2(A) perhaps serves the purposes of deterring forum shop-
ping and the rendering of decrees by courts which have no connection
with the child when it is coupled with article 74.2(C). This provision allows
the proceeding to be transferred to a court where the action might have
been brought "for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and
in the interest of justice." Thus a party who brought suit in a parish
which arguably was his domicile but which had no connection with the
child could be subject to a transfer of the proceeding to another, not
so handy, forum. The UCCJA also contains an inconvenient forum
113. UCCJA § 3, 9 U.L.A. 124, commissioners' note (1968).
114. Id.
115. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2.
[Vienue in a proceeding to obtain custody should be where either party is domiciled
or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile. This reflects the most conven-
ient places to try the proceeding, and it is also the same venue as for an action
for separation or divorce and would thus allow the two matters to be combined.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, comment (b) (emphasis added).
116. As two commentators observed: The Act explicitly states:
"Except under Paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section A [emergency and residual jurisdic-
tion], physical presence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court of this state
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provision. "7 Under both the UCCJA and article 74.2, the inconvenient
forum mechanism is the means by which the courts are encouraged to
exercise "judicial restraint .. .whenever another state [parish] appears
to be in a better position to determine custody of a child."" ' 8 However,
the phrase "for the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and in
the interest of justice" in article 74.2(C) provides rather vague guidance
as to when a court should transfer a proceeding, especially when com-
pared to the detailed inconvenient forum provision of the UCCJA."9 Ad-
ditionally, the wording of article 74.2(C) seems to focus the inquiry on
the interests of the parents and witnesses involved rather than on the
welfare of the child.
In conclusion, the possibilities of forum shopping and of the render-
ing of initial custody decrees by uninformed courts are inherent in article
74.2(A) because venue is proper in the plaintiff's domicile. The transfer
provision of article 74.2(C) is meant to remedy these undesirable
possibilities once they materialize; however, the guidance provided by the
legislature as to when transfer is appropriate is vague and seems to draw
attention away from the main reason why a transfer is being considered
at all, the best interests of the child. Under the UCCJA, the aforemen-
tioned possibilities are largely foreclosed at the outset because the mere
fact of the plaintiff's domicile in a state is not sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on that state to render an initial decree. In addition, the inconven-
ient forum provision gives a court detailed guidance upon which to base
a decision to transfer and focuses the court's inquiry directly upon the
child's best interest. 2 '
to make a child custody determination." This provision does not distinguish be-
tween presence coupled with a claim of domicile ... and presence without such
a claim. The UCCJA clearly seeks to avoid the sophistry of past analyses which
have attempted to make custody jurisdiction turn upon a finding of the "legal
domicile" of a minor child.
McGough & Hughes, supra note 17, at 37 (emphasis added).
117. La. R.S. 13:1706 (1983).
118. UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 139, commissioners' note (1968).
119. The inconvenient forum provision of UCCJA lists five factors to be taken into
account in determining whether it is in the child's best interest to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion: (1) another state is or was the child's home state; (2) another state has a closer con-
nection with the child and his parents or parent; (3) substantial evidence concerning the
child is more readily available elsewhere; (4) the parties agree to another no less appropriate
forum; and (5) the exercise of jurisdiction by this court would contravene any of the stated
purposes of the Act. The provision also provides for the exchange of information between
the possible forums and for the taxing of the costs of the proceedings plus the travel ex-
penses and attorneys' fees of the other parties to the party who commenced the proceeding
"if it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum" La. R.S. 13:1706(G)
(1983).
120. See UCCJA § 7, 9 U.L.A. 139 commissioners' note (1968).
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Continuing and Exclusive Venue: The Hopkins Rule
The Hopkins rule of continuing and exclusive venue was incorporated
in part into article 74.2(B). The court which rendered the initial decree
continues to be a court of proper venue under the statute but is no longer
a court of exclusive venue. Thus the new article solves the problem created
by the Hopkins rule that a court which had long ago rendered a custody
decree remained the only proper forum to modify that decree even after
all the parties involved had moved away. The UCCJA recognizes a con-
cept of continuing jurisdiction in that "even when one of the jurisdic-
tional bases favors a proceeding in a Louisiana court, our courts may
not exercise jurisdiction to modify another state's decree unless it appears
that the court which rendered the decree no longer has jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance with the Act.""' Thus, under
the UCCJA, the jurisdiction of a court which rendered the initial decree
continues exclusively to modify that decree until "all the persons involved
have moved away or the contact with the state has otherwise become [so]
slight [that] modification jurisdiction . . . shift[s] elsewhere."' 2 Under
article 74.2(B), the court which rendered the initial decree does not retain
exclusive venue, but it does retain continuing venue regardless of the lapse
of time or change in circumstances. Of course, article 74.2(C), the transfer
provision, does provide a means by which the proceeding can be moved
to a better informed forum in the event of changed circumstances. Thus
article 74.2 accomplishes two things. First, it remedies the injustice created
by the Hopkins holding that the court which rendered the initial decree
remains forever the exclusive venue to modify that decree regardless of
the present circumstances of the parties. Second, it provides a mechanism
by which the proceeding can be transferred from the court which rendered
the initial decree in the event that a change in circumstances so warrants.
By accomplishing these two things, article 74.2 serves the goal of insuring
that the custody case is heard by a court with access to relevant informa-
tion. The UCCJA continuing jurisdiction rule-exclusive until contact with
the family and child dwindles-by narrowing the choice of forum, serves
the additional goal of achieving greater stability of custody arrangements.
Conclusion
The legislature, in enacting Code of Civil Procedure article 74.2, has
remedied the confusion present under the jurisprudence by providing a
clear expression of the proper venue for actions to obtain or for change
Factors customarily listed for purposes of the general principle of the inconven-
ient forum (such as convenience of the parties and hardship to the defendant)
are also pertinent, but may under the circumstances be of secondary importance
because the child who is not a party is the central figure in the proceedings.
121. La. R.S. 13:1713 (1983); Student Symposium, supra note 12, at 115-16.
122. UCCJA § 14, 9 U.L.A. 154, commissioners' note (1968).
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of custody. The UCCJA when used as a venue provision effectively serves
the purposes of insuring that the court which decides the dispute is the
best equipped to do so according to the best interests of the minor and
of promoting the stability of custody decrees. Should the legislature recon-
sider article 74.2, the questions it will have to confront are whether it
is willing to sacrifice optimal access to information by the forum and
whether it is willing to leave the door open to forum shopping in ex-
change for a statute that is easily applied and predictable. The alternative
is to repeal article 74.2, and, in its place, adopt the UCCJA as a venue
provision. Such a statute would, of course, be less easily applied than
article 74.2. However, the desire to simplify matters should not be allowed
to overshadow the dominant concern behind any statute that regulates
custody proceedings: the best interest of the child.
Sybil Hope Stephens

